The paper gives an analysis of discrepancy between organizational goals and labor's behavior at a Hungarian engineering enterprise. The occasional partial or complete rejection by workers of enterprise goals like the increase of production, the introduction of a new incentive plan, the authors assume, can be traced back to the lack of multilateral and lasting compromise of interests, to the balance of powers within the organization, and to a set of interacting microand macrofactors of the socioeconomic environment.
The problem to be discussed
There is a prevailing belief in Hungarian society that, by means o f the decentralized scheme o f the centrally planned econom y introduced two years ago, m ost obstacles to the grow th o f industrial efficiency can be overcome, directly or indirectly, by differential m onetary incentives. F or the past tw o years, a part o f the enterprises, profits has been used for differential incentive bonuses up to 80 percent o f salary for top m anagem ent, 50 percent for middle managers, and 15 percent for wage earners. The considerable share in profits has seemed to be a driving force for m anagem ent, and managers have m ade m anifold attem pts to increase the efficiency and profits o f the enterprises. They have, how ever, usually failed in their efforts to get workers to contribute m ore to enterprise objectives; the obstacles to the grow th o f efficiency have often continued to exist on the shop floor.
As a general rule at several enterprises labor has rejected enterprise goals and there has rem ained a constant gap betw een requirem ents set up by m anagem ent and the everyday activities o f employees. The lack of sym pathy w ith m anagem ent's objectives has been m anifested in m any ways: w orkers have resisted attem pts to m aintain strict discipline, they have deliberately restricted o u tp u t and perform ed work o f poor quality, etc. Many managers and econom ic leaders are convinced th a t this discrepancy betw een enterprise goals and labor's behavior can be attrib u ted to inadequacies in m onetary incentives and to the lack o f fair wage differentials among workers.
O ur proposition is th a t causal relations are n o t so unambiguous and simple -inadequacies in wage incentives, though closely connected w ith difficulties in workshops, cannot be a ro o t cause for discipline defects and restriction of o u tp u t since they themselves are also a sur face problem . The ro o t cause for difficulties, including also the lack o f fair wage differentials, lies in the structure o f interests and powers w ithin the organization, based on certain micro-and m acrofactors o f the social and econom ic environm ent. These factors originate from the present regulations set up by social and econom ic central agencies, and from the characteristics o f the overall socioeconom ic system o f indus try th at has com e into existence as a result o f the developm ent o f the past few decades.
To place our proposition in a sharper focus, production difficulties in workshops cannot be solved solely by the revision o f the incentive system. The solution o f present problem s, including the introduction of efficient wage differentials, requires com plex changes in the structure o f interests and powers w ithin the enterprise, th at is, com plex m odifica tions in the social and econom ic background.
The enterprise, its workers, and its problems on the shop floor
O ur proposition has been supported by the results o f a sociological survey carried out in an engineering factory in W estern Hungary. The firm to be discussed plays an im portant role in the econom ic progress o f the country. It m anufactures railway cars, tank wagons, various axles for trucks and buses -m ostly for export. It has also ju st started the production o f heavy-duty diesel engines under licence from a leading West G erm an firm. In its different units the enterprise em ploys a total o f about 15,000 physical workers.
The unit at which our sociological survey took place m anufactures bodies for railway cars. Its em ployees, about tw o hundred locksm iths and welders, work in groups according to the nature o f their tasks. The w orkgroups are paid directly on the basis o f how m uch they produce, according to a straight piece-rate system . As the groups' productivity increases, its earnings also increase, and, conversely, as its o u tp u t falls, there is a corresponding drop in wages. Within the group, earnings are n o t divided equally, b u t on the basis o f the personal wage rates o f the members. The wage plan thus has the purpose o f functioning as a group incentive and as an individual incentive at the same time. The activities o f groups are directed by nine forem en and two senior foremen.
The m anagem ent o f the enterprise was n o t satisfied with discipline and work intensity at the unit, for individual workers and even groups often restricted o u tp u t and showed large-scale m obility which endan gered the continuity o f production in workshops. This was why the managers revised the wage plan (1968). The revision was based on the widespread belief th a t setting proper wage differentials would solve the problem .
The wage plan, as a group incentive, seemed to be all right. But as an individual incentive it seemed to be unresponsive to the m anagem ent's efforts geared directly to the quantity o f output. The personal wage rates, regulating the relative ratio of individual earnings w ithin the group, had been set according to a central service and m erit rating system. The favorite factors o f the system -the period o f enterprise service and the qualification o f professional skill -were irrelevant to individual o u tp u t; namely, neither professional practice nor qualifica tion was needed for the highly routine nature o f the work. Thus, per sonal wage rates had tw o m ajor insufficiencies: (1) they did n o t proper ly reflect individual efforts, and they ensured different earnings to workers o f equal perform ance; (2) the scale o f individual wage differen tials, originating from the rates, did n o t reflect the possible differences in individual o u tp u t because it was too narrow. To correct these in adequacies, the m anagem ent abolished the central service and m erit rating system and authorized the forem en and the workgroups, since they had the m ost adequate and accurate inform ation about the efforts of individuals, to set new personal wage rates.
The new personal wage rates set by forem en and labor were, how ever, even less responsive to the m anagem ent's objectives than the pre vious ones. Individual wage inequities continued to exist and the scale o f individual wage differentials became even narrow er (previous index o f differentials: 0.13; new index: 0.10). T hat is how forem en and w orkers m ade a step to defeat the purposes o f the wage plan.
In the course o f our survey we exam ined empirical and logical con nections among the level (scale) o f individual wage differentials ap proved by the em ployees, the structure o f interests and powers within the organization, and the socioeconom ic environm ent in the back ground. O ur survey endeavored to cover all the im portant factors m oti vating the behavior o f workers and forem en. The inform ation needed came from three sources: (1) structured interviews with each w orker in the unit w ith the help o f a substantial questionnaire; (2) unstructured interviews w ith the m ajority o f workers, and w ith the forem en and the representative o f top m anagem ent; (3) data collected by the bureau cracy o f the enterprise.
Labor-management structure of interests and powers
The lopg-run econom ic success o f a business organization requires workable cooperation betw een the tw o m ajor participants in produc tion, managers and workers, i.e., the form ation o f enterprise goals ac ceptable to both o f them . C ooperation and the working out o f com m on goals can be based only on the solution o f conflict situations produced by divergences in the interests o f m anagem ent and labor, on the exis tence o f com prom ise situation in which the two m ajor participants have a relatively good bargain in com parison w ith their contributions to the success o f organization. Com prom ise, however, does n o t develop auto m atically from conflicts; a certain balance o f pow er and influence is necessary betw een m anagem ent and labor to advance the process.
In the case o f the enterprise exam ined, the cooperation betw een managers and workers was not satisfactory: the em ployees rejected the goals th at the em ployers had prescribed for them . C onflict situations seemed to be lasting and the equilibrium o f opposing powers seemed to be upset.
On the assum ption th a t the structure o f divergent interests and various powers is profoundly determ ined by the social and econom ic environm ent, we have exam ined several factors th at m ight have had a direct or indirect effect on the interests, goals, influence, and behavior o f people within the fram ew ork o f the organization. Since the enter prise belongs to a centrally planned econom y, we have paid special attention to regulations by the central agencies.
The clashes betw een the interests o f m anagem ent and labor focused on wages and o u tp u t (the tw o were closely connected in the piece-rate system em ployed).
The m anagem ent, stim ulated by its considerable share in profits and using the prices o f the international m arket as guides, tried to choose a profit-m axim izing mix in its production possibility set (the plant m an agers have had rem arkable freedom in such decisions since the introduc tion o f a decentralized schem e in 1968). It made attem pts to develop new dynam ic and profitable branches (th e production o f heavy-duty diesel engines, etc.), as traditional branches, including the m anufac turing o f railway cars, proved to be unprofitable and subsidies were to be cut o ff by the central agencies. Railway cars could not, however, be shut down right away, and th at is why cuts in the production costs were necessary. In the workshops there was no possibility for intro ducing im provem ents or innovations in the obsolete technology that had been used for decades and thus the m anagem ent decided to cut labor costs, to decrease wages per u nit o f output.
Labor, as its share in profits was low, was m otivated by wages. W orkers were ready to m ake extra efforts for extra pay and aimed their activities at maximizing earnings. The em ployees in the workshops, m ostly o f agricultural origin, were hard-working people, in whose think ing wages were fundam ental in relation to their fam ilies'living standards and also in m easuring their im portance in relation to others in and out o f the factory. The workers, consequently, opposed the m anagers'goal directed at " sw eating" them simply to " fill the enterprise coffers."
Responsibility for the divergences o f m anagem ent and labor interests cannot, however, be fixed entirely on the profit-sharing system , on the high level o f production costs in com parison to prices (owing to a backw ard technology), and on the cutting o f governm ental subsidies and on o ther econom ic factors m entioned. In the lasting confrontation a prom inent p art was played by the control o f central agencies over the level of wages. The central regulations practically pegged per capita wages on a roughly equal level in all engineering enterprises ow ned by the state. Any noticeable increase had to be covered from the share of profits to be divided among the participants in production. The share was considerable in relation to the am ount o f the salaries of managers b u t infinitely small in relation to the total am ount o f wages of em ployees.
Thus the m anagem ent made attem pts to cut wages per unit o f o u tp u t and, at the same tim e, to keep per capita wages unchanged: they re quired extra efforts from the em ployees w ithout being willing, or in fact being able, t<b give them extra reward. 1
Only on the basis o f the conditions o f the enterprise and o f the specified rules the m anagem ent was obliged to follow can we under stand the contradictory features o f its incentive policies. The manage m ent pressed the w orkgroups for increased production, and to this end it em ployed an efficient group incentive, the piece-rate system , w ithout -at least theoretically -any ceiling on earnings. It prom ised extra reward for extra output. Moreover, as we have said, the m anagem ent made attem pts also to improve individual incentives by revising its ser vice and m erit rating system. But when w orkgroup productivity and wages rose appreciably it arbitrarily reset piece rates, cutting also wages per capita and pegging them in one year's average to the level perm itted by the central agencies. Piece rates were being continually cut. In 1969 whey were cut twice, and th at m eant a tw enty percent loss for labor in wages. 2 | Labor-m anagem ent conflicts on the level o f wages were o f utm ost gravity, as wages held a top place in each w orker's evaluation o f his job. They often told us: "We do not come here to produce railway cars, but to earn a living." The reasons for the m oney-centered attitu d e o f labor could be found partly in the present level o f living standards in the 1 The control of central agencies over wages supposedly was aimed at avoiding certain undesirable effects of the economic reform. The total freedom of managers motivated by their share in profits might have rapidly led to growing wages for a part of the workers and to unemployment for others, and/or to a high rate of inflation and to the disequilibrium of supply and demand in the market o f consuming goods. Such a process would have been followed by sharp and open social conflicts instead of the concealed ones described in this paper.
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The regulations of the central agencies do not necessarily call into existence such manage ment policies. In several engineering enterprises the poor standards, the poor scheduling of jobs, and the insufficiencies in the supply of material and in the maintenance of tools automatically prevent management from building up workable incentive systems. Management in other firms, enjoying vast subsidies and favorable internal market conditions set by the central agencies, naturally refrain from pushing workers to increased efforts. In all these cases a tacit agreement is forced by management on labor: it does not offer extra pay, but it does not require extra work either. country and partly in certain aspects o f the environm ent that hindered the satisfaction o f higher-level needs o f individuals w ithin the factory. Working people were frustrated by the m onotony o f the routine jo b , by their inability to advance in professional knowledge, by the pressures to which they were subject as they tried to do work o f quality instead of qu antity, and by their inability to achieve a measure o f respect and autonom y in their everyday activities. The w orkers had practically no change o f prom otion to the positions o f forem en and senior forem en, th at is, to the posts usually within the lim its o f w orkers'career structure. On the one hand, in the u nit to be shut dow n the num ber o f such positions was gradually decreasing, and on the other hand, prom otion at the enterprise was based on factors that m ostly were beyond the control o f workers. For the lack o f satisfaction o f their higher-level needs w orkers m ostly sought com pensation in m oney.
The series o f m anagem ent victories and labor defeats, good bargains on the one side and poor bargains on the other, resulted in a lasting confrontation, the existence o f which reflected also a lack o f equilib rium o f powers, an inequity o f opposing forces at the enterprise. The m anagem ent was wielding an overwhelming power th a t the trade union, designed for the defense o f the interests o f labor, was incapable o f or unwilling to counterbalance. Incentive policies at the enterprise, in cluding the continual cuts in piece rates, were approved also by the executive o f the trade union. The union, as a heritage o f a previous period, united in its ranks all sorts o f m em bers o f the business organiza tion, from unskilled workers to top managers. Several trade-union posi tions were occupied by forem en, by m iddle managers, and even by top managers. Its executive had a considerable share in enterprise profits. In fact, top union leaders and top enterprise managers, despite occasional spectacular discussions betw een them , seemed to be a m onolithic group to the workers. Though labor's rights o f taking part in enterprise affairs, including also decisions about the wage plan and prom otion, were ensured, they had no means and no proper platform to do so. The functioning o f the institution o f w orkers' direct participation in m an agem ent decisions relevant to their interests proved to be profoundly formal. The dom inant push from labor m ight have come only through the inform al organization o f workers, which som etim es had substantial powers, rival to those o f m anagem ent, b u t which in m ost cases was rather weak.
Intramanagement and intralabor structure o f interests and powers
It has been suggested th a t the basic conflict is betw een m anagem ent and labor and th a t it arises from certain micro-and m acroeconom ic and social factors created by the present regulations o f the central agencies and by the realities o f the socioeconom ic progress o f past decades. On the assum ption, however, th at people generally act under the influence o f their environm ent, it seems obvious th a t neither enterprise managers nor factory workers are a hom ogeneous social unit, th a t both are di vided into several strata representing also divergent interests and goals. Thus, the n ex t step o f our exam ination was to take under scrutiny the intram anagem ent and intralabor structure o f interests and powers, which also m odifies the course o f overall enterprise clashes.
W ithin m anagem ent, the forem en and o ther low-level supervisors form ed a separate stratum w ith objectives often contradicting the inter ests o f top managers. These " m en in the m iddle" had substantial powers to influence the production and wages o f workgroups. F o r exam ple, the functional departm ents o f the m anagem ent were incapable o f con trolling production problem s -including supply o f m aterial and m ain tenance -and their solution was up to the forem en (this situation originated from the prim itive level o f technology characteristic o f the small factories o f the past). But top managers, believing in the efficien cy o f centralization w ithin the enterprise, did n o t take into considera tion the influence o f these people. Accordingly, nothing had been done to ensure their cooperation: forem en received a salary inferior to that o f the best workers, and this state o f affairs practically stagnated re gardless o f their special efforts or negligence. As a result, m anagem ent policies were a m atter of indifference to forem en. They neither pro m oted nor hindered the success o f m anagem ent's attem pts to encourage w orkgroup and individual ou tp u t. They restricted their activities to the perform ance o f routine tasks. Their substantial powers m ostly remained potential and their role in the discussions betw een top m anagem ent and labor was only o f third-rate im portance.
Labor was also divided into separate strata. Each w orker considered m anagem ent's incentive policies hostile to his interests and protested m anagem ent's efforts to cu t labor costs. W orkers devotion to m oney was general. However, personal wage rates, seniority in the organiza tion, professional skills, household expenses, structure o f consum ption, traditions, and o ther factors produced a similar com partm entalization w ithin them th a t occured at m anagem ent level. The tw o factors respon sible for the division o f w orkers into strata with divergent interests and various powers were the following .
(1) One factor was the actual level and the future prospect o f the individual's earnings -in fact, his actual and expected econom ic posi tion in the organization. B oth were dependent on wages per capita in Table 3 The growth of personal wage rates by years of enterprise service. the workgroup the individual belonged to and on his personal wage rate. As wages per capita were pegged by the enterprise on roughly the same level in all the groups, differences in the actual and expected econom ic positions could be caused only by personal wage rates. These rates, set prim arily on the basis o f enterprise or professional service, moved rapidly upw ard until the individual reached the age o f 30 and then definitively stopped. As a result, w orkers over 30 earned a relative ly good living, while their fellowworkers under 30 were making a rather bad one. The other side o f the coin: workers over 30 had no prospects o f wage increase, and m anagem ent policies put them in a hopelessly deteriorating position, while younger workers enjoyed rapidly growing wages and in this way were partly com pensated for losses caused by piece-rate cuts.
(2) The second factor is the individual's actual and expected eco nom ic position o u t o f the organization (this factor is closely connected w ith the previous one, as the main sources o f the w orker's incom e are his wages). People over 30 usually had a well-balanced household budget. They generally had their own family houses, well-furnished and m echanized. They had paid debts connected w ith the building or pur chasing o f their homes. They were oriented tow ard obtaining the avail able durable goods, such as television sets, refrigerators, washing ma chines, m otorcycles, etc. To the wages o f the head o f the family the earnings o f the wife were also added -she could also have a jo b when their children reached school age. Workers under 30, on the other hand, carried vast burdens o f fundam ental investm ents connected with the establishm ent o f family life. They were indebted to the savings bank, as they turned vast sums o f m oney to building or getting a house, to furnish it etc. Moreover, since their children were small, their wives usually could n o t take a job (in the differences o f the econom ic posi tions o f families, as we have seen, a dom inant role was played by the co u n try 's housing shortage, which exerted very strong pressure on household budgets for several years in the w orker's life).
On the basis of these tw o econom ic factors and some others connected w ith them , workers were divided into tw o m ajor strata with divergent interests and various powers. The age o f 30 seemed to be the econom ic (and n o t dem ographic) dividing line.
W orkers over 30 vigorously resisted m anagem ent's efforts aimed at the unconditional m axim ization o f w orkgroup production. Instead, they were in favor of the optim ization o f group ou tp u t. O ptim ization m eant a tem parary m axim ization (to exploit the upw ard trend of pro duction and wages stim ulated by m anagem ent), followed by a tem po rary slowdown ( The powers o f the tw o strata o f labor, clashing w ithin the fram ew ork o f the group, were n o t equal. The older workers (over 30) built up an extended inform al organization and occupied nearly all form al posi tions o f pow er in m any workgroups. The existence o f their informal organization, based on the com prom ise o f fairly flexible individual in terests, originated from the m em bers' being cornered by m anagem ent and, in a sense, by younger w orkers as well. People under 30 usually had fewer powers and were also at the m ercy o f their environm ent w ithin the factory. The p attern o f conflicting interests and powers w ithin labor, which the managers tried successfully to exploit on the principle o f divide et impera, had an effect also on the sharpness of the overall confrontation betw een em ployers and employees. Labor, torn by internal clashes, was unable in m ost cases to build up an efficient resistance against m anagem ent, and th a t m ade a considerable contribu tion to the perm anence o f chronic disagreem ent.
Various patterns in the behavior o f labor
W orkgroups showed significant differences in their behavior con cerning perform ance and personal wage differentials. In accordance w ith our proposition, they also showed corresponding significant dif ferences in their patterns o f interests and powers. The various charac teristics o f w orkgroup behaviour can be deduced from the conflicting and interacting interests and powers o f the tw o m ajor strata o f workers and o f labor and m anagem ent, and from the socioeconom ic environ m ent in the background.
We have found three significant types o f workgroup behavior in the fields discussed. W orkgroups belonging to the three separate types had different social com position: they all were recruited from the tw o m ajor strata o f workers, b u t in various ratios. Type I. The great m ajority of group m em bers were older workers (over 30), while younger people (under 30) were in the m inority. The older workers were instrum ental to one another in the following way: they joined together, built up a pow erful inform al organization cover ing an average 70 percent o f group m em bership, and seized all possible m eans o f form al pow er -occupying the positions o f group leaders and trade union functionaries, and also having several Com m unist Party m em bers am ong them . The inform al organization served as an agency through which m em bers obtained and evaluated inform ation about their environm ent. It w orked o u t norm ative rules for collective activity in order to control the aspects o f econom ic and social environm ent that were of consequence to individual m em bers. It functioned as a defense, endeavoring to p ro tect its m em bers and to ex tract the m ost possible for them from their com m on " enem y" . It carried o u t the optim ization o f w orkgroup productivity, blocking the deterioration o f the econom ic positions o f workers and keeping their wages, in com parison with their efforts, at a m axim um . Y ounger workers (under 30) were isolated in dividuals o u t o f the fram ew ork o f inform al organization. They were forced, by the substantial powers o f the older people, to adopt optim i zation of o u tp u t. Though it did n o t always suit their interests -their inflexible and pressing needs for m oney -they could perceive its ad vantages and w orked in relatively peaceful coexistence w ith the others. The m em bers o f the inform al organization, though a decrease in indi vidual wage differences m om entarily contradicted their interests, set personal wage-rate differentials on a m edium (0.09) instead o f a high level. In such a way they m ade a concession to the younger workers to ensure better cooperation w ithin the workgroup against m anagement. G roups in Type I, owing to their highly-developed and one-centered inform al organization, were capable o f counterbalancing, to a rem ark able extent, the powers o f m anagem ent. Som etim es they succesfully underm ined m anagem ent attem pts directed against them ; at other times they suffered defeat, but they never capitulated, and th at is why they usually lived in a peaceful atm osphere in the organization. Some groups, owing to their extraordinary cohesiveness and to their m ono polistic position in the process o f production, even m anaged to reach very high average wages far beyond the level pegged by the enterprise.
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Type II. The m em bership o f w orkgroups was form ed by a great m ajority o f younger workers (under 30) and a small m inority of older people (over 30); in fact, the com position was opposite to groups o f type I. The inform al organization was weak and divided into opposing units, as b o th the older and younger workers created their own in form al bonds o f solidarity to protect their interests. A t the same tim e, the means o f form al pow er were also divided betw een the two strata: b oth occupied group-leader, trade-union functionary, and Com m unist Party positions. O lder workers, however, since they were a small m inor ity and since their powers proved to be weak, were forced to give up their original objectives and surrender to the m axim ization o f o u tp u t urged by their younger fellow-workers and by the m anagem ent as well. This capitulation resulted in a perm anent deterioration o f their posi tions, caused by continual " blo o d y " piece-rate cuts. Thus confronta tion, in a rather sharp form , became lasting w ithin the groups. The high-level individual wage differentials (0.13) can be explained on the basis o f these intralabor clashes. W orkers over 30 were unwilling to m ake a concession to younger people, as cooperation against the m an agem ent was by no m eans possible. They were fighting, in this case with considerable success, to preserve a high level o f personal wage-rate dif ferentials, favorable to them .
The workgroups, to rn by internal struggles, could not counterbalance the powers o f the m anagem ent. The older workers, brought to bay by their m ates, suffered deeply hurting defeats by continual piece-rate cuts, while younger people -though som ew hat com pensated by the grow th o f their personal wage rates -were also hurt.
Type III. The m em bers o f these workgroups belonged to the strata of older workers, whose best interests, under the circum stances o f the com pany, required the optim ization o f ou tp u t. This form o f self defense and deliberate exploitation o f the enterprise was, however, m ade impossible here by certain factors o f physical and econom ic en vironm ent n o t m entioned before. The primitive preparatory operations in the unit were done by these groups, while the others were engaged in the m ore com plicated building o f the railroad car body. The existence o f a group incentive in types I and II was justified by the collective nature o f work, while in these groups it was introduced to simplify adm inistration. The workers, only a few in num ber, perform ed their tasks separately from each other in the different corners o f the shop, and in m ore shifts. The nature o f the work, the lack o f perm anent collec tive activities, kept people back from form ing strong inform al bonds am ong themselves th at were essential for the optim ization o f output. F urtherm ore, per capita wages, being on a roughly equal level in all the o ther groups, were here kept very low by the m anagem ent, also as a result o f the prim itive individual tasks. U nder the pressure of these circum stances, the only choice for groups was the m axim ization of productivity: people were forced to m ake increasing contribution to enterprise objectives for nearly the same am ount o f m oney. As a prim i tive form o f defense they decreased differences in personal wage rates to a m inim um (0.01). However, their defenselessness reached a high level and their opposition to m anagem ent was intensive.
The various types o f w orkgroup behavior in the field o f perform ance and setting wage differentials have been thus deduced from the struc ture of interests and powers w ithin the workgroup (intralabor relations) and within the com pany (labor-m anagem ent relations), based on the whole o f the socioeconom ic environm ent. The various types o f w ork group behavior gave different results: some workgroups managed to reach exceptionally high wages beyond any lim its set by the enterprise or by the central agencies, while the wages o f others were very low. Some workgroups carried out their activities at a com fortable pace, while others came under the pressure o f tight piece rates.
To p u t together the results o f workgroup behavior and the facts about intralabor and labor-m anagem ent relations, let us look at table 6.
Conclusions
The experiences o f the sociological survey seem to support the proposition p u t forw ard convincingly: difficulties on the shop floor, including also the inadequacies o f the incentive system , have their root cause in the structure o f divergent interests and various powers within the enterprise. The decrease in individual wage differentials carried out by labor in opposition to m anagem ent's goals, the occasional deliberate slow dow n o f p roduction by a rem arkable num ber o f workgroups, and the high level o f m anpow er m obility all are sym ptom s o f labor-manage m ent and intralabor conflict situations, and also those o f disequilibrium o f powers. In this respect, the indices o f m obility are also w orth m en tioning. In type I -where tension was relatively low owing to the considerable powers o f workers -only 21 percent o f m em bers left the enterprise during one-and-a-half years. In types II and III -where con fro n tatio n was especially sharp owing to the defenseless situation o f certain strata -about 60 percent o f w orkers gave notice to the firm in the same period. The features o f the structure o f powers played an especially im por tan t role. The lack o f proper division o f the m eans o f pow er among the participants in production resulted in very grave consequences. We also had an impression th at n o t only was the division o f pow er im perfect, but the whole am ount o f m eans at the disposal o f the organization was insufficient. The com pany seemed to be too m uch tied up by central regulations to be capable o f finding m ore satisfactory solutions for its pressing problem s. T he participation o f labor can scarcely be imagined if the m anagem ent itself does n o t have enough freedom in vital deci sions (fo r exam ple, about the level o f wages).
As the structure o f interests and powers is basically determ ined by the socioeconom ic environm ent, the difficulties in the w orkshops can be overcom e only by fundam ental coordinated m odifications in the complex o f micro-and m acrosocioeconom ic factors. The prevailing belief in Hungarian society th a t problem s vis-a-vis labor can be solved by the revision o f incentive plans, by the in troduction o f fair wage differentials, th a t is, by the change in a sole m icroeconom ic factor, is profoundly naive, as proved also by the exam ple o f the enterprise exam ined. The m ajor factors having an influence on the cource o f occurrences w ithin the factory are the following.
(1) In macro-(th a t is, national) measures the m ajor factor is the regulations o f the central agencies o f econom y, such as the profit sharing system , the control over wages per capita, the practice o f setting prices at the internal m arket and o f giving subsidies for business organi zations, the system o f credits for com pany investm ents -in one word, the state o f the decentralized schem e o f the centrally planned econom y introduced in 1968. We can enlist here also regulations directly affect ing labor: the central measures directed at the welfare o f the population (the social insurance system , the housing program ), the policy o f taxa tion, etc. Rules outlining the construction and functioning o f social institutions, such as trade unions, should also be m entioned here. The central regulations are based on a scientific analysis o f the econom ic and social realities th at have been in existence for the past few decades, and include com plicated social, hum anitarian, and political preferences. T hat is why change, though essential, because o f a num ber o f negative side effects, cannot be a rapid process.
(2) In m icro-(enterprise) measures the m ain factors are the incentive policies o f the m anagem ent (th e wage plan o f the workers, the system o f personal wage rating, the incentives for forem en and other middle managers, the practice o f piece-rate setting, etc.), the aspects o f prom o tion, the functioning of trade-union and other social organizations, the state of the decentralization o f internal decisions, the construction of institutions for labor's participation, the existence and stability o f in form al organization, the social com position and stratification of workers, the effects o f their out-of-factory environm ents and traditions, and so on. Though all these m icrofactors are closely connected with the m acro ones, certain im provem ent in the solution o f conflict situations can be achieved even by their revision w ithin the lim its o f the enterprise possibilities, if the m odifications are based on careful consideration.
The following step forw ard, however, requires the contribution of the social sciences: m uch more emphasis should be laid on the defini tion o f the main groups o f participants and the conditions under which they are m otivated to participate and to produce, on processes by which m ultiple centers o f pow er and influence develop and on con flict resolution as a subject o f im portance n o t only in labor-manage m ent relations b u t in m ost o ther intergroup relations w ithin the firm as well.
